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to membership upon presentation of a traveling card, nor
have they shown that they changed their position or relied
upon plaintiff's conduct to their injury. Plaintiff's statement
on being admitted that he was satisfied with the way his
traveling card had been handled and his subsequent acceptance of the benefits of membership did not operate to estop
him from asserting any rights which may have accrued before his admission.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, .J.,
J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 18194.

In Bank.

S~hauer,

J., and Spence,

May 26, 1953.]

Estate of CHARLES J. ARBULICH, Deceased. JOHN
ARBULICH, JR., Appellant, v. THOMAS S. ARBULICH, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Inferences Indulged.On appeal from a judgment, every reasonable inference from
the evidence must be drawn in favor of respondent.
[2] Alienage-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by
resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21,
1947, treaties, statutes and other evidence of foreign domestic
law may be considered in determining whether on that date
United States citizens had a reciprocal right to take property
in Yugoslavia by succession or testamentary disposition, as
required by Prob. Code, § 259.
[3] Statutes- Construction: Treaties- Construction.- Where
treaties or statute law alone are before court their construction is a matter of law, but question of how foreign country
has construed and applied such treaties or statutes is one of
fact.
[4] Alienage-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-A finding by trial
court on issue of reciprocity with respect to right of United
States citizens to take property by succession or testamentary
[2] State statute making right of alien to succeed to property
dependent on reciprocal right in United States citizens, note, 170
A.L.R. 966. See, also, Cal.Jur.2d, Alienage and Citizenship, § 14;
Am.Jur., Aliens, § 40 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1244; [2, 4-9]
Alienage, § 28; [3] Statutes, § 111; Treaties, § 3.
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r!isposition in a foreign country will not bP disturbed on appeal
if there is sufficiPnt evirlence tn sust.>tin Rneh finding.
[5a-5c] !d.-Inheritance- Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by
resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 1947,
a finding that United States citizens on that date did not have
a reciprocal right to take property in Yugoslavia by suceession or testamentary disposition is sustained by evidence of
Constitution of Yugoslavia, effective January 31, 1946, declaring that "right of inheritance is regulated by law"; by a
Yugoslav decree dated July 16, 1946, declaring that foreign
citizens may acquire real property "by legacy . . . only by
previous approval of the competent government agency," and
that such limitations shall not refer to acquisitions by "legal
inheritance"; by a Yugoslav decree dated March 20, 1948,
which tends to confirm the differentiation established by the
prior decree; and by the Yugoslav foreign exchange law which
makes the right of an American citizen to receive Yugoslav
property by testament dependent on uncontrolled discretion
of Minister of Finance.
[6] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21, 1947,
provisions of treaty entered into in 1881 between United States
and Serbia which treat only of "citizens of the United States
in Serbia [Yugoslavia] and Serbian [Yugoslav] subjects in
the United States," rather than of a United States citizen who
dies in the United States and leaves property to a Yugloslav
subject who is in Yugoslavia, are inapplicable on the issue of
reciprocal right of United States citizens to take property by
succession or testamentary disposition in Yugoslavia.
(7] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21,
1947, testimony by Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the United
States that "Yugoslavia accords to citizens and residents of
the United States their full and equitable rights of inheritance under . . . the Convention [treaty] of 1881" and that
"whether the Convention itself is applicable or not . . .
Americans do have their full, complete and unabridged rights
of inheritance to inherit from their relatives or from their
estate in Yugoslavia," serves at most to create a conflict in
evidence as to the ultimate fact and is not controlling on the
issue of reciprocity.
[8] !d.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Rights.-In proceeding by resident and national of Yugoslavia to establish right to inherit
property of a United States citizen who died on March 21,
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1947, any error in admission of opinion evidence as to whether
reciprocity existed with respect to personal property is not
prejudicial where, in the light of other evidence on the subject, it is not likely that a different result would have been
reached in the trial court if the disputed opinion evidence had
not been received. ( Const., art. VI, § 4Yz.)
[9] Id.-Inheritance-Reciprocal Right.s.-The right to take property by inheritance and right to receive that inheritance by
payment in money are part of substantive incidents of normal
legal order of society, and are inseparable from each other .

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco determining heirship.
'1'. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge . .Affirmed.
Haas & Schwabe, Hubbard & Hubbard, Peter .A. Schwabe
and Emmet B. Hayes for .Appellant.
:B~rank

J. 0 'Brien for Respondent.

SCHAUER, J.-Following hearings on petitions to determine heirship in this estate the probate court found that
on March 21, 1947, the date of death of the decedent (see
Estate of Giordano (1948), 85 Cal..App.2d 588, 594 [193 P.2d
771]), the reciprocal inheritance rights prescribed by section
259 of the Probate Code did not exist between residents and
citizens of this nation and those of Yugoslavia as to either
real or personal property. Judgment was thereupon entered
to the effect that decedent's surviving brother Thomas (respondent herein), residing in and a citizen of the United
States, is entitled to distribution of decedent's entire estate,
to the exclusion of a surviving brother, John, who resides in
and is a national of Yugoslavia. The two brothers are decedent's sole heirs at law. John appeals, contending that the
evidence is not sufficient to support the finding of nonreciprocity. The question before us is not whether we, if we were
viewing the evidence initially, should find that the greater
weight seemed to favor appellant or the respondent but is,
rather, whether we can hold that as a matter of law the finding
of the probate court is without substantial evidentiary support. [1] Every reasonable inference must be drawn in
favor of the respondent. (Holmberg v. Marsden (1952),
39 Cal.2d 592, 596 [248 P.2d 417] .) So viewing the evidence
we have concluded that appellant's contention cannot be sustained and that the judgment should be affirmed.
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Charles J . .Arbulich, the decedent, was a naturalized citizen
of the United States who died in San Francisco. By his
will he left his entire estate, consisting of both real and
personal property, to his father if the father survived the
testator, otherwise to the testator's brother, appellant John
Arbulich, Jr., of Yugoslavia. The father predeceased Charles.
Both respondent Thomas and appellant John (by the Consul
General of Yugoslavia, who purports to be John's attorneyin-fact) filed petitions to determine heirship, and this proceeding followed.
The question on the merits, as already indicated, is whether
the evidence supports the court's finding that the reciprocal
rights required by the provisions of section 259 of the Probate
Code did not exist on March 21, 1947. 1 [2] Treaties,
statutes, and other evidence of the foreign domestic law may
be considered. (Estate of Knutzen (1948), 31 Cal.2d 573, 579
[191 P.2d 747]; Estate of Bevilacqua (1948), 31 Cal.2d 580,
582 [191 P.2d 752] .) [3] Where treaties or statute law
alone are before the court the construction thereof is a matter
'Section 259 read as follows on that date: ''The right of aliens not
residing within the United States or its territories to take real property
in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is
dependent in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the
part of citizens of the United States to take real property upon the same
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries
of which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not residing
in the United States or its territories to take personal property in this
State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms
and conditions as residents and citizens of tbe United States is dependent
in each case upon the existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of
citizens of the United States to take personal property upon the same
terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries
of which such aliens are residents. It shall be presumed that such
reciprocal rights exist and this presumption shall be conclusive unless
prior to the hearing on any petition for distribution of all or a portion
of such property to an alien heir, devisee or legatee not residing within
the United States or its territories a petition is filed by any person in·
terested in the estate requesting the court to find that either one or both
of such reciprocal rights does not or do not exist as to the country of
which such alien heir, devisee or legatee is resident. Upon the hearing
of such petition the burden of establishing the nonexistence of such
reciprocal right or rights shall be upon the petitioner. Notice of such
hearing shall be given in the manner provided by Section 1200 of this
code.''
Effective in September, 1947, section 259 was amended by striking
therefrom the last three sentences as quoted hereinabove. At the same
time section 259.1 (added to the Probate Code in 1941 and repealed in
1945) was added, as follows: "The burden shall be upon such nonresident
aliens to establish the fact of existence of the reciprocal rights set forth
in Section 259.''
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of law, but the question of how the foreign country has
construed and applied such treaties or statutes is a question
of fact. [ 4] A finding by the trial court on the issue of
reciprocity is to be treated like a finding on any other issue
of fact and if there is evidence to support it such finding will
not be disturbed on appeal. (See Estate of Schluttig (1950),
36 Cal.2d 416, 423-424 [224 P.2d 695] ; Estate of Reihs (1951),
102 Cal.App.2d 260, 268 [227 P.2d 564] ; Estate of Miller
(1951), 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [230 P.2d 667].)
The following documentary evidence was included in that
before the court in this proceeding:
1. A copy of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, which apparently became effective on January 31, 1946. It is declared
therein, among other things, that (Article 18), "Private property and private initiative in economy are guaranteed. The
inheritance of private property is guaranteed. The right of
inheritance is regulated by law. No person is permitted to
use the right of private property to the detriment of the
people's community . . . Private property may he limited
or expropriated if the common interest requires it, but only
in accordance with the law. It will be determined by law in
which cases and to what extent the owner shall be compensated. Under the same conditions individual branches of
national economy or single enterprises may be nationalized
by law if the common interest requires it. [Article 19.] The
land belongs to those who cultivate it. The law determines
whether and how much land may be owned by an institution
or a person who is not a cultivator. There can be no large
land-holdings in private hands on any basis whatsoever. The
maximum size of private land-holdings will be determined by
law."
2. A Yugoslav decree dated July 16, 1946, pertaining to
the acquisition of real property by foreigners. It provides,
in part, that "Foreign citizens may acquire rights to ownership of real estate in . . . Yugoslavia either by legal business among the living or by legacy (in case of death) only by
previous approval of the competent government agency. . . .
[Such] limitations . . . shall not refer to acquisitions of real
estate by legal inheritance . . . Permits . . . shall be issued
by the Chairman of the Economic Council of [Yugoslavia]
. . . '' with an appeal ''to the Government'' allowed if a
permit is refused. The Chairman of the Economic Council
is ''authorized to issue instructions and explanations in connection with the application of this decree.'' The decree
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provides no guide or standard to control the chairman or
"the Government" iu determining when and whether permits
shall issue.
3. A Yugoslav decree dated March 20, 1948, entitled "Control of Real Estate Transactions,'' which provides in article
5 thereof that ''Foreign citizens may not acquire right of
property on real estate [in] . . . Yugoslavia, except on the
basis of legal inheritance,'' and in article 8 that ''The provisions hereof are not valid for acquiring real estate by
Yugoslav citizens on the basis of legal inheritance or on the
basis of inheritance through testaments.'' Article 10 invalidated the decree of ,July 16, 1946 (item No. 2, hereinabove).
4. A copy of a letter 2 dated January 19, 1949, from A. G.
Heltberg, American Consul in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, addressed to the Controller of the State of California, in which
it is stated, among other things, that the provision of the
Yugoslav decree of March 20, 1948, that "Foreign citizens
may not acquire right of property or real estate [in] . . .
Yugoslavia except on the basis of legal inheritance," has
been ''informally interpreted'' by the claims office of the
Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs "to mean that foreign
citizens may inherit property if they, under Yugoslav law, are
considered to be the natural heirs of the deceased. If property
is willed to some other person than the natural heir that
person may not succeed to the property in question.''
[5a] It is apparent that the evidence summarized hereinabove is sufficient to support a finding that on the date of
decedent's death in 1947 reciprocal rights did not exist with
respect to real property. In the decree of July 16, 1946
(which remained in effect until invalidated by the decree of
March 20, 1948), it is declared that foreign citizens may acquire real property "by legacy (in case of death) only by
previous approval of the competent government agency," and
that such limitations shall not refer to acquisitions by "legal
inheritance.'' As already noted herein, no standards are provided to guide either the government agency or a testator in
determining in what situations, if any, such acquisition by
legacy would be approved, and it is inferable that the granting, the withholding, or the conditions of granting, approval
may vary from case to case according to the discretion of
the governmental agency as exercised in an unbounded field
2

.Admitted into evidence without objection from appellant.
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and unguided by standards of equality of application. The
situation thus appears to be comparable to that before the
court in Estate of 8chlnttig ( 1950), sttpra, 36 Cal.2d 416,
425, in which it was held that when "the taking of estates by
testamentary disposition or succession is a matter of sufferance determinable in accordance with directions of the
Nazi officials and their concepts of national sentiment, there
is no 'reciprocal right' as that term is used in the Probate
Code.''
Furthermore, it is to be noted that section 259 of the
Probate Code, which is here involved, limits the right of the
nonresident alien "to take real property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition,'' to those instances where
there is "a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take real property upon the same terms and
conditions as residents and citizens" (italics added) of the
country of the alien's residence. That the terms and conditions on which foreigners may acquire real property in Yugoslavia by testament differ from those on which it may be so
acquired by Yugoslav citizens is a reasonable inference to
be drawn from the decree of July 16, 1946. Although the
provisions of the decree of March 20, 1948, and of the interpretation thereof by Yugoslav authorities which is set forth
in the consular letter of Jan nary 19, 1949, do not directly
establish Yug·oslav law as of the date of the testator's death
herein (March, 1947), they do tend to confirm that under the
decree of July 16, 1946, a differentiation was established between the right of foreigners who are natural heirs of the deceased to succeed to real estate "by legal inheritance" and
any rights claimed by other foreigners to take real estate
"by legacy (in case of death) . "
[6] Appellant contends, nevertheless, that the provisions
of article IP of a treaty entered into in 1881 between the
United States and the Kingdom of Serbia (of which the present
Republic of Yugoslavia is the successor government) and certified by the Secretary of State of the United States as re3
Article II of the treaty reads as follows: "In all that concerns the
right of acquiring, possessing, or disposing of every kind of property,
real or personal, citizens of the United States in Serbia and Serbian
subjects in the United States, shall enjoy the rights which the respective
laws grant or shall grant in each of these states to the subjects of the
most favoured nation.
"Within these limits, and under the same conditions as the subjects
of the most favoured nation, they shall be at liberty to acquire and dis·
pose of such property, whether by purchase, sale, donation, exchange,
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maining m full force and effect between this country and
Yugoslavia, are applicable and controlling in appellant's
favor on the issue of reciprocity. It may be noted that the
:first paragraph of article II seemingly treats only of "citizens
of the United States in Serbia [Yugoslavia] and Serbian
[Yugoslav] subjects in the United States," rather than, as is
the situation in the present case, of a United States citizen
who dies in the United States and leaves property to a Yugoslav subject who is in Yugoslavia, and therefore is not here
applicable. Even if we assume its applicability in that respect,
however, the rights gTanted are only those given by each of
the contracting nations ''to the subjects of the most favoured
nation,' 'and do not purport to equal the rights given or guaranteed by each of the contracting nations to its own citizens.
Consequently the treaty provisions do not establish the reciprocal rights required by the Probate Code.
[7] Testimony by the Ambassador of Yugoslavia to the
United States that "Yugoslavia accords to citizens and residents of the United States their full and equitable rights of
inheritance under . . . the Convention [treaty] of 1881, . . .
[and that] whether the Convention itself is applicable or not
. . . Americanll do have their full, complete and unabridged
rights of inheritance to inherit from their relatives or from
their estate in Yugoslavia," serves at most to create a conflict
in evidence as to the ultimate fact and is not controlling on
the issue of reciprocity. Upon the record we are bound to
hold that the evidence is not as a matter of law insufficient
to support the finding of the trial court that at the time of
decedent's death reciprocal rights within the meaning of the
applicable statute did not exist as to real property.
[8] As to whether reciprocity existed with respect to personal property, there is a substantial conflict of opinion evidence and both appellant and respondent urge that evidence
of that nature, offered by the other, was improperly received.
\Ve need not pass upon such contentions, however, because it
does not appear that the errors, if any, in regard to the admission of opinion evidence were prejudicial. In the light
marriage contract, testament, inheritance, or in any other manner whatever, without being subject to any taxes, imposts, or charges whatever
other or higher than those which are or shall be levied on natives or on
the subjects of the most favoured state.
''They shall likewise be at liberty to export freely the proceeds of
the sale of their property, and their goods in general, without being subjected to pay any other or higher duties than those payable under similar
circumstances by natives, or by the subjects of the most favoured state.''
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of the other evidence upon the subject, hereinafter mentioned,
we do not think it likely that a different result would have
been reached in the trial court if the disputed opinion evidence
had not been received. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 41;2.)
[5b] Aside from the expressions of opinion, a copy of the
Yugoslav Constitution, as hereinabove mentioned, and copies
of Yugoslav decrees governing transactions with foreign
countries and their nationals were received in evidence without objection, and such Constitution and decrees in themselves
support the finding of the trial court that reciprocity did not
exist with respect to personal property. Provisions of the
Constitution have already been mentioned. The first of the
decrees, which became effective September 7, 1945, provides:
"630. By virtue of Article 2 of the Resolution of November
30, 1943 on the Supreme Legislative and Executive People's
Representative Body of Yugoslavia as a provisional organ of
the supreme people's authority in Yugoslavia and in connection with the Resolution of August 10, 1945 covering the
change of name of the Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia into Provisional People's Assembly of the
Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, and at the suggestion of
the Minister of Finance, the Presidium of the Provisional
People's Assembly of the Democratic Federative Yugoslavia
decree.
''THE LAW
''REGULATING PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS WITH FOREIGN
COUNTRIES
"(FoREIGN ExcHANGE LAw)
''BAsiC RuLES

''Article

1

''All financial transactions with foreign countries, as well
as all transactions within the country in relation to foreign
countries that may affect the development of the credit balance of our country and the international value of our
domestic currency (foreign exchange transactions) are subject to the control of the Federal Minister of Finance (foreign
exchange control).

''Article 2
"Primarily the following transactions are subject to control.
"(a) All transactions within the country and with foreign
countries: in foreign exchange, claims and debts in foreign
currency and other values in foreign currency;
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''(b) All transaf;tions with foreign countries: in domestic
emrency, credits and debits in domestic currency and other
values in domestic currency;
'' (c) .All transactions with foreigners within the country,
causing changes in property relations between our country
and foreign countries ; and . . .
''Article 3
''The term transaction from .Articles 1 and 2 as used in
this law means the transfer of values and metals and payments, it also means the establishment, cancellation and change
of obligations and actual rights to values and metals, as well
as changes of holders of rights and obligations.
''Article 4
''Permission must be had for transactions described in
Articles 1 and 2 of this Law according to foreign exchange
regulations.
''Article 5
"It is forbidden to conclude business in the country the
amount of which in domestic currency is tied to gold or some
foreign currency . . . .
''Article 6
" ( 1) The Federal Minister of Finance as the supreme
foreign exchange authority, exercises his control over foreign
exchange through : [various agencies] . . .
"(2) The Federal Minister of Finance regulates the limits
of jurisdiction as between the foreign exchange authorities
in regard to the exercising of foreign exchange control, be it
by Regulations from .Article 25 of this Law, or by separate
decisions.
''Article 7
"(1) Transactions, subject to foreign exchange control according to this Law, may be conducted only by persons and
establishments authorized to do so by the competent foreign
exchange authorities, unless the conduct of such business IS
permitted by the foreign exchange rules themselves. . . .
''Article 8
''The National Bank, whenever authorized by the Federal
Minister of :B-,inance, may at any time request the holders in
the country to offer for sale to the National Bank all their
foreign exchange (regardless whether it be in the shape of
claims in foreign currency, checks, drafts, etc.), foreign cur-
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rency, foreign values and precious metals. If the National
Bank decides to buy, it shall fix the terms . . . .

' 'Article 12
'' ( 1) rrhe term 'devisa' as used in the foreign exchange
regulations means a claim abroad on whatever basis, in whatever currency, regardless of the manner of disposal. . . .
''Article 13
"(1) The term foreigner·s as used in this Law means all
persons and corporations with permanent residence or seat
abroad, regardless of citizenship of persons and ownership
of enterprises.
"(2) rrhe term domestic persons means all persons and corporations with permanent residence or seat within the country, regardless of citizenship of persons and ownership of
enterprises. . . .
"Article 16
'' ( 1) The penalties for foreign exchange infractions are: ...
'' 2. Confiscation of objects or values constituting the
foreign exchange infraction, in full or in part. . . .
"(2) The Federal Minister of Finance shall pronounce
penalties . . . .
' 'Article 25
''The Federal Minister of Finance shall issue more detailed
rules, regulations and decisions for the execution of this Law,
upon consulting the National Bank . . . . "
The second decree, effective October 25, 1946, confirms
the decree of September 7, 1945, and amends it in various
respects which appear to be largely immaterial here. However, article 24 of the second decree provides that ''The Minister of Finance of FPRY is herewith authorized to issue
regulations, instructions, orders and decrees for the execution of this law,'' thus confirming the apparently unlimited
power of the Minister of Finance over foreign exchange transactions.
Appellant urges that the "Foreign Exchange Law"
has no materiality in relation to the question of reciprocity;
that it is merely "regulatory of foreign exchange and has no
reference whatever to rights of inheritance.'' But a reading
of the entire substance of the documents mentioned makes it
apparent that the trial court was justified in reaching the conclusion that under Yugoslav law a citizen of the United States,
at the time of decedent's death, had no definitely ascertainable and enforceable right to receive Yugoslav property by
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and that the receipt of any such property would
in each ease upon the largely, if not entirely, uncontrolled discretion of the Minister of F'inance. 'I'his is far different from a standardized regulation which might merely
delay the transmission of gold, money, or other stores of value
from one nation to another. (See Estate of Schluttig (1950),
supra, 36 Cal.2c1 416, 425; cf. Estate of .Miller (1951), supra,
104 Cal.App.2d 1, 12, 13.) [9] Here it is pertinent to observe, as vvas declared in Estate of Blak (1944), 65 Cal.App.
2c1 232, 288 [H50 P.2c1 567]: "'I'he 'right' to take property by
inheritance and the 'right to receive' that inheritance by payment in money, have long been recognized as part of the substantive, legal and sanctioned incidents of the normal legal
order of society . . . . The 'right' to receive the benefits of
the inheritance is a necessary and inherent corollary to the
'right' to take by inheritance. One is not separable from the
other. 'L'he one includes the other. If the right to take exists
. . . the right to receive exists . . . ''
[5c] Upon the record before us, which includes the Constitution and the Resolutions and Decrees of Yugoslavia as
above mentioned, we cannot hold that as a matter of law the
trial court was not justified in concluding that whether a citizen of the United States, as of the date of decedent's death,
might in any particular case actually receive possession and
marketable title to real estate in Yugoslavia devised to him or
personal property, or its value, bequeathed to him, was a
matter of grace or individual indulgence rather than of right
based on uniform law.
By reason of our conclusion that no prejudicial error is
shown and that the evidence supports the finding of the trial
eourt that on the date of decedent's death reciprocity as contemplated and deiined by our law did not exist in Yugoslavia with respect to either real or personal property, it beeomes unnecessary to consider or decide respondent's further
contentions.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion is out of harmony with my concept
of the principles of .law applicable to this case and I am in
full accord with the views expressed in the able and learned
41 C.2d-4
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opinion prepared by Mr. ,Justice Peters when this case was before the District Court of Appeal and adopt said opinion
as my dissent:
''Charles J. Arbulich, the decedent, was born in the country
now known as Yugoslavia, came to the United States, became
an American citizen, died in San Francisco on March 21,
1947, and left an estate consisting of real and personal property. By his will he disinherited his American citizen brother,
the respondent Thomas S. Arbulich, and left his entire estate
to his father, if he should survive the testator, and if not
then to his brother, the appellant, John Arbulich, Jr., a Yugoslav citizen and resident. The father predeceased Charles.
Both Thomas and John (John through the Consul General
of Yugoslavia) filed petitions to determine heirship, it being
contended by Thomas that John was ineligible to take under
the will for the reason that Yugoslavia, so it is claimed, does
not grant reciprocal rights of inheritance to American citizens inheriting from citizens of Yugoslavia within the meaning
of section 259 of the Probate Code. John claimed such
reciprocal rights existed. A petition by one claiming to be
the widow of Charles was also filed, but the issues presented
by that proceeding have been settled and are not here involved.
''After a trial which spread over many months because
of numerous continuances granted to permit the parties to
secure and to present evidence on the basic issue of reciprocity,
the trial court determined that reciprocity did not exist, that
John was therefore ineligible to take under the will, and
that the entire estate should be distributed to Thomas as the
sole remaining heir at law. John, through the consul general,
appeals.
''Before discussing the evidence which, except for the testimony of the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, is
almost entirely documentary in character, some reference
should be made to the general law governing such proceedings.
It should be pointed out that section 259 of the Probate Code
is not merely a procedural statute, but is part of the substantive law of succession. That being so, the statute as it
read at the time of the death of the testator desiring to leave
property to an alien governs. (Estate of Giordano, 85 Cal.
App.2d 588 [193 P.2d 771] .) Charles died March 21, 1947.
Section 259 as it read in March of 1947 (Stats. 1945, p.
2208, chap.l160) and until its amendment in September of that
year, then provided: 'The right of aliens not residing within
the United States or its territories to take real property in
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this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the
same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the
United States is dependent in each case upon the existence of
a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the United
States to take real property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective countries of
which such aliens are residents and the right of aliens not
residing in the United States or its territories to take personal
property in this State by succession or testamentary disposition, upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of the United States is dependent in each case upon the
existence of a reciprocal right upon the part of citizens of the
United States to take personal property upon the same terms
and conditions as residents and citizens of the respective
countries of which such aliens are residents. It shall be presumed that such reciprocal rights exist and this presumption
shall be conclusive unless prior to the hearing on any petition
for distribution of all or a portion of such property to an
alien heir, devisee or legatee not residing within the United
States or its territories a petition is :filed by any person interested in the estate requesting the court to find that either
one or both of such· reciprocal rights does not or do not exist
as to the country of which such alien heir, devisee or legatee is
resident. Upon the hearing of such petition the burden of
establishing the nonexistence of such reciprocal right or rights
shall be upon the petitioner. Notice of such hearing shall
be given in the manner provided by Section 1200 of this code.'
''Thus, as the section then read, there was a statutory rebuttable presumption that reciprocity existed, and the one
contending there was a lack of reciprocity had the burden of
proving that fact.
''The cases have also established the law to be that while
the interpretation of foreign statutes and of treaties, when
they alone are before the court, is a question of law, the question of how such statutes and treaties have been interpreted
and applied by a foreign country is a question of fact. The
appellate courts will not disturb a finding of reciprocity or
of nonreciprocity that is supported by a presumption or is
based on conflicting evidence. (Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal.
2d 416 [224 P.2d 695]-:finding of nonreciprocity with Germany on April 3, 1945, affirmed; Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.
App.2d 1 [230 P.2d 667], finding of reciprocity with Germany as of April 22, 1942, affirmed; Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.
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App.2d 232 [150 P.2d 567], a finding of reciprocity with the
Nether lands (date of death not disclosed, but prior to 1942
and during German occupation of Holland) affirmed; Estate
of Giordano, 85 Cal.App.2d 588 [193 P.2d 771], a finding of
nonreciprocity with Italy as of January 17, 1945, affirmed;
Estate of Rm:hs, 102 Cal.App.2d. 260 [227 P.2d 564], a finding
of reciprocity with Germany as of November 24, 1946, affirmed; Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal.App.2d 621 [235 P.2d
837], a finding of reciprocity with Romania as of March 15,
1949, affirmed.) In all of these cases it was held that where
the finding of reciprocity or nonreciprocity was based on conflicting evidence or supported ·by a rebuttable presumption it
would not be disturbed by an appellate court, even where,
as. to the same country, one trial court had found reciprocity
to exist and another that it did not. (Compare the Schluttig,
Miller and Reihs cases, cited supra.)
"The case of Estate of Il.ennecly, 106 Cal.App.2d 621 [235
P.2d 837], sets forth several other rules that are here applicable. It held that the facts that a limited nationalization or
socialization of property and industry had taken place in
Romania, or that that country was communistic in nature
and dominated by Russia, did not compel a finding of nonreciprocity. It also held that once a statute enacted prior to
the death of the testator involved is proved to exist, a presumption that such statute continued to exist arises under
the provisions of section 1963, subdivision 32, of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and that once such a statute is proved to
exist, it will be presumed that the terms of such statute
have been carried out under the provisions of section 1963,
subdivisions 15 and 33, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
"The cases of Estate of JJiiller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1 [230 P.2d
667], and Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232 [150 P.2d 567],
held that the fact that the property inherited in a foreign
country could not be immediately transferred to the United
States, dnc to the war or to foreign exchange regulations,
\Yas not relevant on the issue of reciprocity.
'' 'l'hus, in the instant case, appellant was entitled, in the
trial court, to the rebuttable presumption that reciprocity
existed. If he could prove the existence of a treaty or statute
of Yugoslavia enacted prior to March 21, 1947, granting
reciprocity, he was then entitled to the rebuttable presumptions that that law continued to exist, and that such law was
and would be enforced according· to its terms. Since the trial
court has fonnd against these presumptions and against
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reciprocity, the question is whether, keeping in mind the
burden of proof and these presumptions, there is any substantial evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom to support the finding.
''Although the burden was on respondent to prove nonreciprocity, the appellant agreed to present his evidence that
reciprocity existed before respondent offered his evidence.
"'!.'he appellant first introduced a treaty of 1881 between
Serbia and the United States, and the certificate of then Secretary of State George C. Marshall dated May 21, 1948, duly
authenticated, certifying that such treaty is still in force and
effect between Yugoslavia and the United States. That certificate traces the history of the Kingdom of Serbia into the
Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, into the Kingdom
of Yugoslavia, and finally, in November of 1945, into the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and certifies that
by agreement between the two countries the Serbian treaty
of 1881 was still in full force and effect. The final clause of
the certificate states 'that the said treaty remains in full force
and effect between the United States of America and Yugoslavia.'
''Article II of that treaty reads as follows:
" 'In all that concerns the right of acquiring, posses;sing,
or disposing of every kind of property, real or personal,
citizens of the United States in Serbia and Serbian subjects in
the United States, shall enjoy the rights which the respective
laws grant or shall grant in each of these states to the subjects of the most favoured nation.
" ''Within these limits, and under the same conditions as
the subjects of the most favoured nation, they shall be at
liberty to acquire and dispose of such property, whether by
purchase, sale, donation, exchange, marriage contract, testament, inheritance, or in any other manner whatever, without
being subject to any taxes, imposts, or charges whatever other
or higher than those which are or shall be levied on natives
or on the subjects of the most favoured state.
'' 'They shall likewise be at liberty to export freely the proceeds of the sale of their property, and their goods in general,
without being subjected to pay any other or higher duties than
those payable under similar circumstances by natives, or by
the subjects of the most favoured state. •
"There was next introduced the certificate of Sava N. Kosanovic, Ambassador to the United States for Yugoslavia, duly
authenticated by our State Department, and dated May 15,
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1948, concerning the law of Yugoslavia with respect to the
estates of decedents. The certificate contains the categorical
assertion that reciprocity exists within the meaning of section
259 of the Probate Code. The certificate states that the
ambassador knows of his own knowledge that the Constitution and laws of Yugoslavia' accord to citizens of the United
States of America, including citizens of the State of California,
though not residing in . . . Yugoslavia, the reciprocal rights
of inheritance prescribed and referred to in Sections 259 . . .
of the Probate Code of the State of California. The Constitution and laws of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia
permit and grant to citizens of the United States of America,
including citizens of the State of California, though not resident in ... Yugoslavia rights equal to those accorded to
Yugoslav citizens residing in ... Yugoslavia to take by will or
succession any and all property located within ... Yugoslavia,'
subject to the Nationalization Law of December 5, 1946, as
amended April 28, 1948. The certificate then states that this
Nationalization Law as amended provides for 'the nationalization of real property owned by foreigners, except immovable property of farmers tilling their own land, buildings
serving in the main as the homes of the owners thereof,' but,
under the provisions of that act 'all the owners of nationalized
property, are entitled to full compensation for such property.'
''The certificate then goes on to state that by agreement with
the United States 'all treaties previously concluded with the
former Kingdom of Serbia ... are in full force and effect'
between the United States and Yugoslavia. The certificate then
quotes article II of the United States and Serbia treaty of
1881, above quoted, and then certifies that the government of
Yugoslavia 'has at all times construed and does now construe
and respect said treaty as providing for and guaranteeing
complete reciprocal rights of inheritance between the United
States of America and ... Yugoslavia so that citizens of the
United States of America, including citizens of the State of
California, residing in the United States or wherever they may
reside have the full and unabridged right to inherit and to
receive and have paid to them all inheritances, by last will
and testament or by succession, all money and property, real
and personal, bequeathed, devised or due to them by the laws
of the succession situated in the Federative Peoples Republic
of Yugoslavia from the estates of deceased citizens' of Yugoslavia, subject only to the Nationalization Law as amended.
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''A supplemental certificate of the ambassador, duly authenticated and dated October 14, 1948, was also introduced. The
ambassador there certifies that the rights of foreigners to
inherit property in Yugoslavia as set forth in the original certificate has been the law since 1918 and up to the present time,
and that there has been no change in such laws and none is
contemplated. It is certified that 'it has always been the
fixed policy of my Government and its predecessors to fully
protect, preserve and assure the rights of all foreigners and
residents outside of Yugoslavia to enjoy, take and receive
full rights of inheritance of property, real, personal or mixed,
without discrimination, in the same manner and to the same
extent as residents and nationals of Yugoslavia' subject only
to the Nationalization Laws. It is further certified, when
moneys are due and payable to Yugoslav residents from United
States decedents as a result of inheritance, that the recipients
in Yugoslavia receive such moneys in Yugoslavia at the official
rate of exchange free of any imposts, levies or taxes, 'and they
have free and unabridged use and enjoyment thereof' subject
only to such limitations as are imposed on Yugoslav nationals
for the protection of the state. This supplemental certificate
also notes that on July 19, 1948, the United States and Yugoslavia negotiated a claims agreement by the terms of which
the Yugoslav government engages to authorize Yugoslav nationals indebted to anyone in the United States 'to meet such
indebtedness on maturity.' By the terms of that agreement
Yugoslavia agreed to pay $17,000,000 to the United States for
American property nationalized in Yugoslavia, to be distributed by the United States among the rightful claimants.
''In addition to these two certificates, Ambassador Kosanovic
was called as a witness by appellant. He testified that he was
not only the Yugoslav ambassador to the United States, but
also a minister in the cabinet and a member of the Praesidium,
the highest authority in his country. He presented a copy of
the Constitution of Yugoslavia adopted in 1946 which, according to his testimony and supported by an examination of the
document, makes no discrimination, so far as the right to
enjoy and inherit property is concerned, between Yugoslav
citizens and foreigners. The Constitution provides that the
'inheritance of private property is guaranteed. The right of
inheritance is regulated by law.' In addition, the ambassador
testified that there was no discrimination as against foreigners
in connection with the right of inheritance, and that if inher-
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itance taxes are paid in the United States on a bequest to a
Yugoslav citizen, that person will receive the inheritance without further tax. He several times reiterated his statement that
there were no laws or rules or regulations in any way
restricting the right of an American to receive and to enjoy
his inheritance in Yugoslavia. On cross-examination he testified
that his country had exchange controls, and that under Yugoslav law anyone in the country receiving foreign exchange
could be compelled to sell it to the state bank at regular exchange rates. He testified that there were no big estates in
Yugoslavia, that the land formerly owned by big landowners
had been nationalized, and that the maximum ownership of
one individual is twenty-five hectares,* but that former owners
including foreigners, were compensated. He also testified that
money received by inheritance by Yugoslav citizens could be
fully owned and enjoyed by such citizens.
"Appellant then, over the objection that it was incompetent,
irrelevant and immaterial, introduced as an official document
an official communication between the Yugoslav Ministry of
Justice and the Yugoslav Ministry of Labor dealing with the
reciprocity question. This document states that under Yugoslav law 'the courts extend protection to all individuals in the
exercise of their [inheritance] rights, regardless of whether
they be Yugoslav nationals or foreign nationals.' It also
states that under the 1881 treaty, which Yugoslavia recognizes,
American citizens inheriting from Yugoslav nationals enjoy
exactly the same rights and privileges over such property as
do Yugoslav nationals. It is also asserted that the Ministry of
Justice has always informed Yugoslav courts that reciprocity
of inheritance exists between Yugoslavia and the United States.
Attached is a copy of a decree of a Belgrade court distributing
a portion of an estate in Yugoslavia to a United States citizen.
"Another official communication between the Yugoslav Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Labor, over objection, was
introduced in which it is stated that the Ministry of Finance
has never issued any regulation limiting the right of inheritance of estates of Yugoslav citizens by American citizens.
The document states that, due to the shortage of foreign exchange, it has not always been possible to transfer .funds from
Yugoslavia to the United States, but that it is the intention of
the government to allow such transfers as soon as conditions
permit.
*A hectare is 2.4 71 acres.
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'' 'l'his was appellant's case. It is obvious that such evidence,
independent of the presumption of reciprocity, would fully
support a finding of such reciprocity. But the trial court
fo11nd that reciprocity did not exist. The question is whether
thAre is any substantial evidence to support that finding.
"Respondent first offered two letters, one from C. W.
Cannon, United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, elated
August 14, 1947, and addressed to the then Attorney General
of California, and the other from A. G. Heltberg, American
consul at Belgrade, dated November 4, 1948, and addressed
to Frank 0 'Brien, respondent's attorney. Neither of the
letters to which these two letters were responses was offered.
Both letters introduced purport to discuss certain laws and
regulations of Yugoslavia and purport to give opinions as to
how they are enforced. Appellant objected to the introduction
of these letters on the grounds that they were incompetent,
irrelevant, and immaterial, \Yere hearsay and that no proper
foundation had been laid for their introduction. 'l'he objections
were good. The letters should not have been admitted. There
was no showing that Cannon or Heltberg were experts on
Yugoslav law. In fact, the Heltberg letter states that 'this
office can not assume responsibility for statements made in
respect to the laws of Yugoslavia.' The letters were merely
informal documents, and certainly were not official documents.
The important question of whether a sovereign state abides by
its laws and treaties should not be made to depend upon informal offhand opinions of officials who may or may not be
experts. Without a further showing, the letters should not
have been admitted.
"It must not be assumed that these two letters support
the finding of nonreciprocity. They do not. Both relate
primarily to the foreign exchange controls limiting the transfer of funds from Yugoslavia to this country, a factor which,
under the cases already cited, is not relevant on the issue of
reciprocity. Cannon's letter was apparently in response to a
letter from the attorney general telling Cannon that several
Yugoslav residents and citizens had applied to recover funds
on deposit in California banks, and inquiring if American
citizens with money on deposit in Yugoslavia could withdraw
such money, and requesting information about any currency
regulations that might exist. Cannon replied that there were
stringent regulations in force 'with regard to the export of
foreign exchange and the transfer of property abroad.' Ref-
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erence is made to pertinent provisions of the Foreign Exchange
Law putting all foreign exchange transactions under government control, and requiring a permit for such transactions.
The following paragraph of the letter is particularly relied
upon by respondent:
"'According to the Embassy's information, the Yugoslav
authorities have, so far, not only granted no foreign exchange
permits to American claimants to the proceeds of property in
Yugoslavia, but have, with minor exceptions, made it impossible for American citizens to establish their claims. In only
one known instance has an American citizen actually been able
to bring his claim to the point where his attorney could apply
for a foreign exchange permit, and that application has been
refused. This case involved a legacy.'
''The letter then refers to the confiscation and nationalization of many American properties. This letter was written
before the claims settlement agreement, already referred to,
was entered into between the two countries.
''The letter of Heltberg to 0 'Brien also deals primarily
with the foreign exchange law, a copy of which was enclosed.
The letter states that the 'law provides for a tight control of
all foreign currencies held by Yugoslavia, and it is the opinion
of the Embassy that American heirs ordinarily would not be
able to transfer their inherited monies [sic] into American
currency.' Attention is then called to the fact that the embassy
has records of but one case of such a transfer since the end of
the war, and to a communication from the Yugoslav government informing the embassy that 'it would grant transfers of
funds derived from legally inherited properties within the
limits of available foreign exchange stocks. However, because
of lack of foreign exchange, the amounts for the time being
would have to be deposited with the National Bank of the
Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia in Yugoslav currency as property of foreign successors.'
"The letter goes on to mention the fact that the Yugoslav
decree .of March 20, 1948 'permits acquisition of real estate
in Yugoslavia by foreigners but only on the basis of legal inheritance or for official use. All other real estate owned by
foreigners would be nationalized. The American heir, however, would have little control over his inherited properties. He
would have to have the approval and consent of the competent
state authorities before he could sell, transfer or dispose of
the property. He would not be able to sell, transfer or dispose
of the property to a non-Yugoslav citizen. The amount of in-
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come derived from the property and the use of the property
would be determined by local housing authorities. Furthermore, to complicate matters, the Yugoslav Government does
not recognize the right of their citizens to be nationalized as
American citizens. The Embassy believes it possible that a
person possessing Yugoslav nationality under Yugoslav law
and American citizenship under American law could inherit
Yugoslav real estate in the same manner as other purely Yugoslav citizens. When such a dual national is subsequently
divested of his Yugoslav nationality, his previously inherited
properties in Yugoslavia would presumably be seized without
right of indemnity.'
''There was next introduced into evidence by respondent,
without objection from appellant, a letter with six enclosures
to Lawyer 0 'Brien dated December 24, 1948, from Francis E.
Flaherty, Acting Assistant Chief, Division of Protective Services, Department of State, Washington, D. C. The letter calls
attention to the decree of March 20, 1948, passed a year after
the death of the decedent here involved, which contains the
following sentence: 'Foreign citizens may not acquire right
of property on real estate on the territory of the Federative
People's Republic of Yugoslavia, except on the basis of legal
inheritance.' The letter then states that it had been thought
that the Nationalization Law, which provides: 'On the day
this law becomes effective, all real estate owned by foreigners
. . . will be nationalized,' nullified the right of aliens to inherit
at all, but by a decree of June 23, 1948, the right of foreigners
to gain ownership of real property 'on the basis of legal inheritance' was reaffirmed. The letter then sets forth the same
restrictions on such ownership as were set forth in Heltberg's
letter above quoted, and then states that the Nationalization
Law and the June decree 'are presently interpreted by Yugoslav officials so as to permit alien heirs to inherit or succeed to
property only when, under Yugoslav law, they are also natural
heirs of the deceased.'
''The enclosures are translations of various laws and decrees
and of a note from the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs
to the United States dated October 9, 1948. Several of the
enclosed laws and decrees relate to the foreign exchange controls that have already been mentioned. One of the enclosures
is a decree dated March 20, 1948, relating to the 'Control of
Real Estate Transactions.' This decree was not in effect when
decedent diea. It provides that all transfers of real property
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are 'subject to prior approval by the competent state authorities,' and provides that such authorities shall deny such
approval when the transfer is made for speculative purposes, or
when such transfer will produce a larger income than needed
for livelihood, or would exceed the maximum area allowed for
agricultural ownership. This decree also prohibits a foreign
citizen from owning land 'except on the basis of legal inheritance.' .Attached to this decree is an 'Obligatory Interpretation' by the Praesidium, the highest authority in Yugoslavia,
to the effect that a Yugoslav who acquires another citizenship
forfeits his real estate to the state without compensation.
''The official note above referred to from the Ministry of
Foreign .Affairs of Yugoslavia to this country stated that the
'Yugoslav Courts strictly apply all Yugoslav provisions, laws
and international agreements clearly regulating the rights of
foreign citizens to acquire or inherit to [sic] real or personal
property situated in Yugoslavia, within the limits of the existing provisions and without any discrimination, i.e., under the
same conditions as citizens of the most favoured nation.' Reference is then made to the decree of March 20, 1948, limiting
foreign real estate holdings to those acquired as 'heirs at law,'
and then it is argued that such provision is consistent with
treaty obligations because all foreigners are treated alike. It
is then stated that as to transfers abroad of legally inherited
properties the Yugoslav government 'will grant such transfers
within the limits of available foreign exchange stocks,' and
when such stocks are not available the sum in question can be
temporarily deposited in the national bank, in Yugoslav currency, as property of foreign successors.
"Without objection, appellant next introduced a Yugoslav
decree dated July 16, 1946, relating to the acquisition of real
property by foreigners. It provides that foreigners may
acquire real property in Yugoslavia 'either by legal business
among the living or by legacy (in case of death) only by previous approval of the competent government agency.' .A lease
to a foreigner for over five years likewise requires a permit,
but neither of these limitations applies 'to acquisitions of real
estate by legal inheritance.' .Agencies are designated with
permit issuing powers and the right of appeal granted from
their decisions.
".Also without objection a copy of the Nationalization Law
was introduced. In court counsel for respondent read into the
record an amendment to that act adopted April 28, 1948, more
than a year after the death of the decedent here involved. By
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the amendment, most real estate, as of the effective date of the
amendment, owned by foreigners, was nationalized, except real
estate operated by peasant farmers or used by the owner as
living quarters. The amendment also provided that Yugoslav
citizens who became foreign citizens lose the right of ownership
of real estate.
''Also without objection there was introduced another letter
from Heltberg, American Consul in Yugoslavia, addressed to
the California State Controller and dated January 19, 1949.
Most of the material in this letter is cumulative of material
already introduced. It refers to the decree of March 20, 1948,
limiting the right of foreigners to acquire real estate except
'on the basis of legal inheritance,' and then points out that such
clause has been informally interpreted by the Yugoslav officials
'to mean that foreign citizens may inherit property if they,
under Yugoslav law, are considered to be the natural heirs of
the deceased. If property is willed to some other person than
the natural heir that person may not succeed to the property
in question.' It is also pointed out that Americans succeeding
to property in Yugoslavia would be faced with various restrictions and controls. The letter then discusses the penalties of
dual citizenship, and then continues: 'Since 1945, the Embassy has no record of any case where American citizens have
been heirs in Yugoslav estates. It is generally believed that the
political affiliations of the American heir would not affect his
right to inherit unless he was a dual national and his property
liable to confiscation for crimes against Yugoslavia.'
"The only other exhibits introduced by respondent were
two booklets of speeches by Yugoslav leaders which add
nothing to the other evidence already mentioned.
''On this evidence the trial court found that reciprocity as
to both real and personal property did not exist. The estate
here involved consisted, at the time of death, of both real and
personal property, the real property having been sold during
the course of administration. There can be no doubt at all
that the weight of the evidence indicates that reciprocity
exists. Certainly that is true as to the personal property.
However, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that reciprocity
exists as to the real property. It is probably true that there
are evidence or inferences therefrom that support the finding of
nonreciprocity as to real property. The evidence of the laws,
decrees and interpretations to the effect that foreigners can
succeed to Yugoslav real estate only if they are heirs at law,
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that a Yugoslav who acquires American citizenship forfeits his
rights in real property in Yugoslavia, etc., probably support
the finding of nonreciprocity as to the real property. But
even as to this issue the evidence is not satisfactory because
most of these laws, decrees and interpretations were passed or
made after the death of the decedent here involved. It is the
law in effect at the time of such death in which we are here
interested. It is by no means clear that such laws, decrees and
interpretations are construed to be retroactive. That may be
cleared up on a new trial.
"Even though it be assumed that there is some evidence,
or inferences therefrom, that support the finding of nonreciprocity as to the real estate, there are other factors di>lclosed
by the record that require a reversal and the granting of a new
trial. The record discloses that the trial court considered and
gave great weight to evidence not relevant to the issue of reciprocity, and that the finding of nonreciprocity was partially
based on this nonrelevant evidence. That this is so is conclusively demonstrated by an examination of the transcript, of the
memorandum opinion of the trial court, and of the findings.
''On numerous occasions during the trial the court expressed
great distrust of the form of government existing in Yugoslavia, and expressed great interest in what would happen to
the bequest here involved when delivered in Yugoslavia. Great
interest was shown in the foreign exchange regulations that
would constitute a restraint on an American citizen transferring Yugoslav funds inherited there to this country. For
example, the trial court stated at R.T. page 221: 'We know
that Yugoslavia today is dominated by a Communistic government. They are in power today. Now, this Court, the stand
that I have taken is that I would have to have pretty good
evidence before I would distribute to anyone, or to any government back there that is dominated by the Communists. [What
became of the presumption that reciprocity exists?] Having
this case in mind, I met people who have been there, lived
there, even when I was on a little vacation in Arizona, and I
met a woman who lived there, and they took all of her property.
They confiscated all of the business of her husband and herself.' At pages 135, 150, 160, 223 and 243 appear other
comments by the trial judge indicating how strongly he was
motivated by the fact that the government of Yugoslavia was
socialistic or communistic.
"The theory upon which the trial court proceeded is also
disclosed in the memorandum opinion. It is there stated :
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'Furthermore, it has not been established to the satisfaction of
the Court that the said John Arbulich, Jr. (the Yugoslav heir]
would receive the benefit of any distribution to him of the
balance of the estate, consisting of cash in excess of $30,000.00.
It was established at the hearings by the testimony of the Yugoslav Ambassador Kosanovic that the present government of
Yugoslavia is Communistic and that the property rights of
individuals are completely ignored. Under the circumstances
the Court cannot in good conscience order $30,000.00 or more
distributed to the claimant in Yugoslavia or to any representative of that country without any assurance whatever that the
distributee would ever receive any part of such funds.'
''Thus the trial judge not only indicated that he would
not consider the presumptions already mentioned in favor of
reciprocity, but also indicated that he had forgotten or would
not consider the documentary and oral testimony to the effect
that the Yugoslav heir would be permitted in Yugoslavia to
enjoy the full benefits of the bequest.
"The weight given by the trial court to these factors
is also disclosed in the formal findings. Finding X reads as
follows : 'That at the time of death of said decedent the Government of Yugoslavia was Communistic and has been ever since,
and that the property rights of individuals are ignored,
and that, under the circumstances, the Court could not, in good
conscience, order distribution to the claimant in Yugoslavia.
That under the laws and regulations of Yugoslavia, John Arbulich, Jr., does not have any rights of ownership or control
of his property, and if distribution were ordered to John
Arbulich, Jr., it would, in fact, be distribution to the Communistic Government of Yugoslavia. Such distribution would
be against public policy and contrary to provisions of Section
27 of the California Probate Code.'
"There is no evidence at all that the Yugoslav claimant
would not be permitted to enjoy his legacy in Yugoslavia.
The evidence is all the other way. The solemn declaration
o£ the Ambassador from Yugoslavia that the Yugoslav claimant would receive the money free of any tax and that he
would enjoy 'free and unabridged use and enjoyment thereof'
could not thus lightly be disregarded.
The ambassador is
the highest diplomatic official of the country he represents, and
his declarations about the law and practices in his country
are entitled to great weight.
"The fact that the court disapproved of the form of the
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government of Yugoslavia was not relevant at all on the issue
of reciprocity. Yugoslavia is a sovereign state and is recognized as such by the government of the United States. As
long as some right of inheritance is recognized in that state,
and the evidence here without conflict discloses that it is, the
fact that such right differs from the right of inheritance in
this country, or that as an individual a judge may disapprove
of the form of government, are factors which are not relevant
and should not be considered on the issue of reciprocity. This
was clearly pointed out in the Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal.
App.2d 621 [235 P.2d 837], involving Romania, a country
that is not only communistic, but within the sphere of influence
of Russia, which Yugoslavia certainly is not. Some degree of
socialization and nationalization has taken place in most European countries, a policy we as individuals may or may not
approve, but as judges passing on the issue of reciprocity, the
form of such governments is a false factor, and a matter for
each sovereign country to determine for itself.
"The fact that an American claimant of an estate in Yugoslavia would be subject to foreign exchange controls and
could not immediately receive his legacy in this country is
also an irrelevant factor. Practically every country in the
world has some limitation on the export of wealth from the
country. Such factor has nothing to do with the issue of
reciprocity. It was so held in Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d
1 [230 P.2d 667], and Estate of Blak, 65 Cal.App.2d 232 [150
P.2d 567].
"Much is said in the briefs about the proper interpretation
of the treaty of 1881 and about how such treaty should be
interpreted in view of the case of Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
[67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633, 170 A.L.R. 953]. The question
is not how that treaty should be interpreted as a matter of law,
but how the contracting parties have interpreted it. The ambassador testified that it had been interpreted to grant reciprocity
to all American nationals. While there is no evidence directly
contrary to this, there may be inferences that would support a
finding to the contrary. Any gaps in the evidence on this
point can be supplied on the new trial.
''Enough has been said to indicate that the finding of
lack of reciprocity was based partially upon inadmissible evidence, upon factors irrelevant to the issues, and upon laws and
regulations and decrees passed after the death. of decedent.
This being so, the judgment cannot stand. A new trial should
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be had at which only admissible evidence and relevant factors
are considered.
"There is one other point that must be considered. Respondent contends, and the trial court found, that appellant
was not properly represented in the proceeding. For that
reason, it is urged, this judgment must be affirmed. It should
be pointed out that, in spite of this finding, the trial court
also disposed of the case on its merits. Such disposition is,
of course, inconsistent with a finding that the appellant had
made no proper appearance in the action.
"The contention that appellant was not properly represented is based upon the fact that the lawyer appearing on
behalf of appellant was appointed by the consul general of
Yugoslavia to represent appellant. The lawyer had no power
of attorney from appellant nor any other direct authority to
represent him. Throughout the trial. counsel for respondent
objected on this ground, and the trial judge, on many occasions,
observed that he thought a personal power of attorney was
indispensable. As already pointed out, an express finding was
made on this issue.
"'rhe petition of John Arbulich, Jr., alleges that it is
filed by the consul general of Yugoslavia as attorney in fact
for John. It is further averred that under the power and
authority vested in the consul general by the United States and
by the laws and treaties between the United States and Yugoslavia, he, as consul general, has the power and authority to
act as attorney in fact for his nationals who inherit American
property. The recognition by the United States of the consul
general with power 'to exercise and enjoy such functions,
powers and privileges as are allowed to the Consuls General
of the most favoured Nations in the United States' was duly
proved. The question is, can the consul general appear in our
courts as attorney in fact for his nationals in a probate proceeding? Can a consul appoint counsel to represent such
nationals? The answer is clear that he may.
"The parties discuss the proper interpretation of an artir·lr·
in the Consular Convention between the United States and
Serbia concluded in 1881, contemporaneous with the other
Serbian treaty already mentioned in this opinion, and, like it,
recognized by both the United States and Yugoslavia as being
still binding. Article XI provides:
" 'In the case of the death of any citizen of the United
States in Serbia, or of a Serbian subject in the United States
without having any known heirs or testamentary executors by
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him appointed, the competent local authorities shall give information of the circumstances to the Consuls or Consular
Agents of the nation to which the deceased belongs, in order
that the necessary information may be immediately forwarded
to the parties interested.
'' ' Consuls General, Consuls, Vice Consuls and Consular
Agents shall have the right to appear personally, or by delegate, in all proceedings on behalf of the absent or minor heirs
or creditors until they are duly represented.'
''The parties argue over the proper interpretation of this
treaty. Appellant argues that the second paragraph should
be read independently of the first so as to give the consul
general the power alleged to exist. Respondent argues that the
first paragraph limits the operation of the second paragraph to
nationals dying abroad in the other country, and does not
include the right to represent in the other country nationals
residing at home. If the document alone be considered, either
interpretation is reasonable. But the treaty provision must be
considered together with applicable principles of international
law. Without reference to any treaty provision, it is a well
settled principle of international law that consular representatives are deemed to be international attorneys in fact for their
nations. One of the earliest cases so holding, and a leading
case on the subject, is The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.)
152 [5 L.Ed. 229]. In that case the United States Supreme
Court held that a vice consul of Spain was entitled to make
a claim by way of libel on behalf of Spanish owners of a
Spanish ship resident in Spain and whose identities were
unknown to the consul. In that case the following frequently
quoted statement appears ( p. 168) : 'On the first point made
by the attorney-general, this court feels no difficulty in deciding, that a vice-consul, duly recognized by our government, is
a competent party to assert or defend the rights of property of
the individuals of his nation, in any court having jurisdiction
of causes affected by the application of international law. To
watch over the rights and interests of their subjects, wherever
the pursuits of commerce may draw them, or the vicissitudes
of human affairs may force them, is the great object for which
consuls are deputed by their sovereigns ; and in a country
where laws govern, and justice is sought for in courts only, it
would be a mockery, to preclude them from the only avenue
through which their course lies to the end of their mission.
The long and universal usage of the courts of the United
States, has sanctioned the exercise of this right, and it is im-
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possible, that any evil or inconvenience can flow from it.
Whether the powers of the vice-consul shall, in any instance,
extend to the right to receive, in his national character, the
proceeds of property libelled and transferred into the registry
of a court, is a question resting on other principles. In the
absence of specific powers given him by competent authority,
such a right would certainly not be recognized. Much, in
this respect, must ever depend upon the laws of the country
:from which, and to which, he is deputed. And this view of the
subject will be found to reconcile the difficulties supposed to
have been presented by the authorities quoted on this point.'
"In the case of In re Tartaglia's Estate, 12 Misc. 245 [33
N.Y.Supp. 1121], it was held, both as a result of an interpretation of a treaty with Italy and by general international law,
that the Italian consul general could properly apply and
receipt for the distributive shares of personal property on
behalf of the Italian heirs.
''In the case of Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 41
N.Y.Supp.2d 752, there is a good collection of case and text
authorities. There, both by treaty and on general principles,
the Estonian consul general was permitted to appear and set
aside a default judgment, and to defend a suit against the
Estonian State Bank, treated in the opinion as a private
person.
"The case of In re Zalewski's Estate, 292 N.Y. 332 [55
N.E.2d 184, 157 A.L.R. 87], is another good case on the subject, and collects and comments on many relevant authorities.
There it was held by the New York Court of Appeals that
either by treaty or by general principles of international law, a
consular representative could even exercise on behalf of one of
its nationals resident in the home country the personal right
of a widow to elect not to take under a will. While three
justices dissented in that case, they did so only on the ground
that the power of the consul did not extend to the exercise of
such a personal right-they did not disagree with the majority
holding that a consul has the right to appear and to represent
his nationals.
"In interpreting the treaty provision here involved, the
fo1lowing principles stated in In re Zalewski's Estate, 292
N.Y. 332 [55 N.E.2d 184, 186, 157 A.L.R. 87], amply supported
by authority, are applicable: 'In arriving at the meaning of the
treaty we are bound to remember that it is the supreme law of
the land . . ., that its words are to be taken liberally in the
light of evident purposes . . . and that, since the pact is done
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in counterparts, one in each language little use can be made of
local technical definitions of words. . . . When two constructions of a treaty are admissible, one restrictive of the rights
that may be claimed under it and the other liberal, the latter
is always to be preferred. . . . ''This court would not readily
lean to favor a restricted construction of language, as applied
to the provisions of a treaty, which always combines the
characteristics of a contract, as well as a law.'' The Bello
Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 152, 171 [5 L.Ed. 229].'
"With these well settled principles in mind we have no
reasonable doubt but that the treaty here involved should be
interpreted so as to confer a treaty right on the consuls of the
contracting countries to appear on behalf of their nationals not
otherwise represented and to represent them in the courts of
the other country.
''This conclusion would be almost inevitable were it not for
the case of Estate of Clausen, 202 Cal. 267 [259 P. 1094].
There it was held that the Danish consul did not have the right
to receive distribution of and receipt for the interests of
Danish nationals under the then treaty with Denmark. The
treaty there involved was one entered into in 1826 and related
solely to problems of navigation and commerce existing between the two countries. It contained a clause that for the
protection of navigation and commerce each country would
agree to receive and admit consuls from the other who should
enjoy all the privileges and powers of consuls conferred by
either on the consuls of the most favored nation. Nearly a
hundred years after this treaty was entered into, United States
entered into a much broader treaty with Germany which expressly conferred upon consuls of either country the power on
behalf of nonresident nationals to receive and to receipt for
distributive shares of estates to which such nonresident nationals were entitled. The Supreme Court of California ruled,
purely as a matter of interpretation of the treaty, and without
reference to general principles of international law, that the
treaty between Denmark and the United States related solely
to problems of navigation and commerce, and that the powers
conferred by that treaty on consuls related solely and exclusively to such problems. 'fhus the treaty with Germany did not
operate under the most favored nation clause to confer any
rights on Danish consuls except in connection with navigation
and commerce. The court did not discuss the right of the
Danish consul to appear and represent his national residing in
Denmark in the probate proceeding under the general prin-
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ciples of international law above discussed. It simply decided
that such consul, under the treaty, had no power to have distributed to himself and to receipt for the share of the estate to
which the Danish national was entitled. (See, also, Petersen
v. Lyders, 139 Cal.App. 303 (33 P.2d 1030], and Lyders v.
Petersen, 88 F.2d 9.)
''The present case differs from the Clausen case in several
particulars. The present case does not involve the right of
the Yugoslav consul general to have distributed to him and to
receipt for the property bequeathed to appellant. The proceeding on appeal is not for distribution, but to determine
heirship. Several times during the trial counsel appointed by
the consul general stated that he was not contending that the
estate should be distributed and receipted for by the consul
general. He agreed that the court could order the estate distributed directly to appellant, and, in that event, offered to
see that the estate was distributed to appellant and receipted
for by him. This is important, not only because it serves to
distinguish the instant case from the Clausen case, but because
it also meets the doubts expressed in the case of the Bello
Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 152 [5 I.1.Ed. 229]. In the quotation from that case above set forth the United States Supreme
Court expressed doubt that, under general principles of
international law, a consular representative could have the
proceeds of the pending action distributed to himself, but had
no doubts about the power of such representative to appear and
to represent his absent national.
"In the second place, the Clausen case limited its decision
to an interpretation of the treaty involved. It did not discuss
the power of a consul, independent of treaty, to appear and
to represent his nonresident nationals in lawsuits in the
country to which such consul was accredited.
"In the third place, the instant case is distinguishable from
the Clausen case because unlike the treaty involved in the
Clausen case, the treaty here, properly interpreted, confers
the very power involved. Moreover, under general principles
of international law, consuls possess the power to appear for
and to represent their nonresident nationals in the courts of
the country to which such consul is accredited.''
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing· was denied J·une 18,
El53. Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

